|
|
||||||||||||||||||
|
|
NIST GCR
02-830
|
![]() |
Figure
4. Time Path of Benefits from Japanese Data with Confidence Interval
![]() |
Results from Japanese
data indicate that the effect of consortia on patenting outcomes
tends to persist for relatively long periods of time. In fact, patenting
in the targeted area seems to increase a bit after the cessation
of the consortium, before leveling off again in later years. This
may be due to the rules under which subsidies were disbursed to firms
in Japan. Any idea conceived as a direct result of the consortia
was supposed to be patented in the name of the consortium itself
rather than in the name of the participating firms. This created
an incentive for firms to delay patenting some of their most useful
ideas until after the official end of the consortium. For our purposes,
the important point to keep in mind is that the effect of consortia
can be quite long lasting. This suggests that our estimates of the
impact of ATP-funded consortia, based on only four years of data,
may underestimate the total impact of research consortia on patenting
outcomes of the firms that were involved.
CONSORTIA CHARACTERISTICS
Using Japanese data,
we examined the impact of two consortia characteristics on patenting
outcomes: spillover potential and product market proximity. Economic
theory predicts a positive association between spillover potential
and patenting outcomes, and a negative association between product
market proximity and patenting outcomes. Research consortia may intensify
competition in the industry, in turn lowering profits. Firms that
are direct competitors might conduct less R&D in a consortium
than they would individually.
Spillover potential
is assessed using the measure of technological proximity defined
previously. Product market proximity measures competitive distance between
each pair of firms in a consortium by dividing the number of product
markets in which two firms in a consortium meet by the
total number of product markets in which each firm is active. Two
firms that meet one another in a large number of product markets
are presumed to be more proximate to each another than firms with
few or no overlapping products.2 Based on data from 591
distinct product markets, we constructed an average measure of proximity
for firms within a consortium.3
Many of the variables
on consortium characteristics do not change over time. Including
them in a panel regression creates statistical problems (see Moulton,
1986). For that reason, we collapsed the time series dimension of
the data. Consortium outcomes are measured as the cumulative sum
of patenting in the targeted classes, taken over a fifteen-year horizon
from the official inception of the project (or for as long as the
data allowed). This sum was regressed on summed measures of direct
and indirect research inputs, pre-consortium technological strength,
and time-invariant consortium characteristics.
The first two columns
of Table 8 illustrate the impact of technological_proximity and product_market_proximity on
patenting outcomes.4 Consistent with theoretical predictions,
the first variable has a positive impact on consortium outcomes,
whereas the second variable has a negative impact, albeit one that
is only marginally significant in a statistical sense.
These results have important implications for our previous analysis of U.S. data. First, it confirms the importance and robustness of technological proximity as a predictor of consortium success in a data set with a much longer, more complete time series dimension.
Table 8. Firm-Consortium Level Analysis Using Japanese Data| Variables | (1) |
(2) |
(3) |
| Budget | .068 (.039) |
.196 (.045) |
|
| Pre-project patenting | .799 (.026) |
.756 (.030 ) |
|
| Real indirect inputs | .028 (.011) |
.020) (.013) |
|
| Technological proximity | .497 (.250) |
.020 (.284) |
1.16 (.41) |
| Product market proximity | -.323 (.298) |
-.552 (.341) |
-.164 (.524) |
| Technological goal | |
(.121) |
.254 |
| Cumulative total patents | .103 (.042) |
.142 (.051) |
|
| Year | -.114 (.014) |
|
|
Second, the negative
effect of product market proximity on consortium outcomes suggests
that bringing product market rivals into a consortium is unlikely
to produce a successful pattern. Few ATP-funded consortia have this
structure, and that is probably a good thing.
The third column adds
an additional variable to the regression equation that measures participating
firms perceptions concerning the degree to which the technological
goals of a given consortium are close to commercialization versus pre-commercial or basic. The
positive, statistically significant coefficient on this variable
suggests that projects focusing on pre-commercial research are likely
to yield better outcomes. Thus, Japanese data lend support to ATPs
focus on pre-commercial research.
CAVEATS IN APPLYING JAPANESE
LESSONS TO U.S. CONSORTIA
When comparing results
from Japanese consortia to the U.S. experience, a number of caveats
apply. Research consortia may have a larger impact on Japanese research
productivity than they would in the United States because of the
very different structure of the labor market in Japan. Most scientists
and engineers employed in Japanese corporations are part of the so-called lifetime
employment system, spending most of their careers with a single
company. In contrast, U.S. scientific labor tends to be quite mobile
across firms. The movement of scientists and engineers between U.S.
companies is an important mechanism by which new technology diffuses
in manufacturing industries. Because the same mechanism is less operative
in Japan, research consortia may play a particularly important role
in enabling new technological innovation to flow across firm boundaries.
There is also greater involvement of the Japanese government in establishing consortia, selecting members, directing research, and ensuring that the results are widely diffused throughout Japanese industry than in the United States. The ATP model of consortium governance is essentially a bottom-up model, in which the burden of organization falls upon the participating firmsin particular, the joint venture lead participant. By contrast, Japanese consortia are run according to a more top-down approach, in which the sponsoring ministry is generally more involved in directing the activities of the consortium. Our preliminary investigations suggest that the degree of centralization is negatively correlated with good outcomes, which, again, validates ATPs approach to consortium management.
NOTES:
Return to Contents or go to next section.
Date created: January
24, 2003
Last updated:
August 2, 2005
ATP website comments: webmaster-atp@nist.gov / Technical ATP inquiries: InfoCoord.ATP@nist.gov. NIST is an agency of the U.S. Commerce Department |